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1. Introduction: Background ‘Knowledge’ in Confirmation Theory 
 
Confirmation functions are typically defined in terms of conditional probabilities, 
which involve three distinct types of argument: hypotheses (h), evidence (e), and 
background statements (b). Most obviously, this goes for Bayes’s theorem; see, for 
example, Salmon (1990). But here are some other examples: 
 
 
 Popper (1983) 
 
 
Milne (1996) 
 
 
Huber (2008) 
 
Now many authors on confirmation-related issues (or working in formal epistemology 
more generally)—for example, Keynes (1921), Eells and Fitelson (2000), and Huber 
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(2007)—refer to b as ‘background knowledge’.1 But I shall argue in this paper that 
this should not be understood as knowledge in the usual sense of mainstream 
epistemology, i.e. as entailing belief and justification.2 In fact, I will argue that it need 
concern neither justification nor belief, so that b does not even concern ‘knowledge’ 
on the true belief account proposed by Sartwell (1992). What I say will not tell 
against the rather more radical (and unpopular) notion of objective knowledge 
defended by Popper (1972, p. 286)—‘where we take the word “knowledge” in the 
objective or impersonal sense, in which it may be said to be contained in a book; or 
stored in a library; or taught in a university’—except in so far as it may need to be 
conceded that b should be true. Indeed Allo (2010, p. 251), who advocates the kind of 
informational turn that I will argue for (in a limited context in the present paper), cites 
Popper (1968) approvingly and notes that his approach: ‘immediately rules out most 
traditional theories of knowledge’. For present purposes, it will suffice to understand 
‘information’ by way of a subtractive definition, in line with Dunn (2008, p. 581), as: 
‘what is left from knowledge when you subtract justification, truth, belief … [and] the 
thinker.’ (We will later see that there is, however, some dispute over whether ‘truth’ 
should be subtracted.) 
 
Although I will here focus on b, some might also be tempted, following Williamson 
(2000), to suggest that all evidence should be construed as knowledge too. (This is 
according to the E=K thesis, that all evidence is knowledge and vice versa.3) One 
interesting result of taking this route is that the distinction between e and b may 
appear somewhat arbitrary, provided that b should be understood as background 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Somewhat surprisingly, given his philosophical predilections, even De Finetti (2008, p. 36) writes 
that ‘to speak of the probability of an event tout court, without any qualification, does not have any 
concrete meaning. Rather, it must be kept in mind that probability is always relative to the state of 
knowledge of the person who is making the judgement.’ Elsewhere on the same page, however, he 
instead writes of changing states of information. And I believe he would have agreed with me, if 
pressed, that this is a superior formulation. This is indicated by his earlier choice of section title (p. 18) 
as ‘Probability Depends on the Subject’s State of Information’, where he explains ‘By the expression 
“state of information” I mean all of the previous experience, everything the person has seen, heard, 
read, and so forth.’ (But note that ‘knowledge possessed’ is also referred to, again, on the same page. In 
short, De Finetti appears to use ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ interchangeably, perhaps as a result of 
insensitivity to the difference between the notions in mainstream epistemology.) See also De Finetti 
(1974, §5.91), where the discussion is conducted purely in terms of information. 
2 Note that this does not presuppose a JTB-style account of knowledge. For example, Williamson 
(2000) takes knowledge to entail belief and justification (although he also holds that it is unanalyzable). 
See also Rowbottom (2010). 
3 For other criticisms of this view from the point of view of formal epistemology, see Williamson 
(2010, pp. 4–6). 
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knowledge. In short, if E=K holds then b would be background evidence in virtue of 
being background knowledge. And this raises the question “What’s the difference 
between the evidence (e) and the background evidence (b)?” 
 
One plausible way to answer this question is to appeal to the temporal order of the 
evidence, with b being evidence that is old relative to e, and the notion of relative 
evidence. For example, if e & b entails h but neither e nor b entails h in isolation, then 
we may say that e is evidence for h relative to b. Thus if b is our knowledge now, and 
we discover e tomorrow, then we might declare: “We have discovered new evidence 
for h!” But this would be elliptical. What we would really mean, in terms of the more 
fundamental notion of absolute evidence, is that the confirmation value of h relative 
to current total evidence (i.e. e & b) is greater than the confirmation value of h 
relative to past total evidence (i.e. b). 
 
It may therefore be helpful to construe my following argument as that background 
evidence should not be construed as knowledge, or else that background statements 
should not be understood as evidence (e.g. if one insists that E=K). And since whether 
some evidence (or statement) is in the background rather than the foreground is 
merely a matter of historical contingency—e.g. the precession of the perihelion of 
Mercury may have been discovered after the proposal of general relativity, and 
therefore not have been part of b as it was at the time of its actual proposal—it is easy 
to see how what I will argue goes for e if it goes for b. In short, in what I argue below 
it is reasonable to substitute e for b (with a few superficial adjustments where 
necessary). To give a quick example, if b can involve information recorded in a book 
but not believed then so can e. 
 
2. ‘Background Knowledge’ without Belief 
 
When we employ confirmation functions, we are often interested in how confirmed a 
hypothesis is, or was, relative to the information available at a particular point in 
time.4 Sometimes, it is true, we will only be concerned with what the scientists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It would be wrong to dismiss appeal to ‘background knowledge’ simply on the basis that b will far 
outstrip what is believed by any individual scientist. Instead, one should allow for group beliefs, as 
well as group knowledge. One might also use an intersubjective (or interobjective) account of 
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involved in a scenario believe (or believed); for example, we might be interested in 
the estimated confirmation value of a theory with respect to views shared in a frank 
discussion, e.g. of Pauli’s pilot wave theory relative to the debate concerning this at 
the Solvay conference of 1927.5 However, other times we may be concerned not only 
with what scientists actually believe (or believed), but also with other information 
accessible to the community. (And note that what is said is not always what is 
believed. The norms of assertion are not always respected.) 
 
Consider a scientist who has conducted many experiments to test a theory, and has 
painstakingly recorded the results in his notebook (or in a computer file). While he 
may remember what his statistical analysis of those results showed, e.g. the calculated 
average value of some variable, the relevant error range, and so forth, he would not 
remember each and every result. (In fact, he may never have possessed beliefs about 
many of those results. He may have typed them into a spreadsheet unthinkingly, or set 
up apparatus to gather them in an automated fashion.) So if his statistical analysis 
were flawed, he would be mistaken about how his results bear on the theory. Thus we 
might also say that he would be mistaken about how well confirmed (or corroborated) 
the theory was by his experimental results. And semantic quibbles aside, it is clear 
that information which has been collected as a result of human effort but never 
believed can bear a confirmation (or corroboration) relation to hypotheses in which 
we are interested. This is exactly why good scientists are concerned to check that they 
have analysed their data properly.6 
 
I can only see one objection to this claim, which is that the data referred to above may 
not be information because it is not propositional in format. My response to this is 
twofold. First, as I will later explain, I am not convinced that all information need be 
propositional. Second, and more importantly at the present juncture, the foregoing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
probability, where group degrees of belief are central, in one’s favoured confirmation function; see 
Gillies (1991) and Rowbottom (2008a, Forthcoming). 
5 See Cushing (1994) for more on this. 
6 What I say here gels with the view of Allo (2011, p. 420) on being informed: ‘what is… the 
difference between being informed that p and having a true belief that p? The main reason for keeping 
these distinct is that the latter includes a mental state whereas the former doesn’t.’ On such a view, we 
may say that we are primarily interested in how the scientist is informed, with a view to calculating 
confirmation. (I have some worries, however, about whether mental states are ultimately the issue. For 
example, one might take a betting interpretation, or a dispositional interpretation, of degrees of belief. 
See the further discussion in Rowbottom (2012, Forthcoming).) 
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argument goes through even if all information is propositional. This is because we 
may imagine a scientist writing complete sentences in his notebook, i.e. explicit 
propositions, even if one wants to insist that recording numbers in a table does not 
constitute a kind of short-hand (as I think it does). 
 
Actually, it may even be possible to advance an argument that we ought to consider 
all the information accessible to us (from a purely epistemic, not pragmatic, point of 
view), even when some of it is believed by no-one, on the basis of Carnap’s (1962, p. 
211) ‘Requirement of Total Evidence… [that] the total evidence available must be 
taken as a basis’ when a probability is calculated. Normally, this requirement is only 
considered in a synchronic and/or local sense, with respect to background beliefs. 
And it is easy to see why it holds in this case. Electing to disregard an experimental 
result that is favourable for a theory which you dislike—without making any attempt 
to explain the result away via appeal to experimental error, or mistaken auxiliary 
hypotheses used in generating predictions—is an epistemic no-no. Carnap (ibid.) 
offers further examples:  
 
If a judge in determining the probability of the defendant’s guilt were to 
disregard some relevant facts brought to his knowledge… or if a scientist 
pleading for a certain hypothesis omitted in his publication some experimental 
results unfavourable to the hypothesis, then everybody would regard such a 
procedure as wrong. 
 
Although Carnap neglects to mention this, however, his very own examples suggest 
that the principle may also be appropriate in a diachronic and/or ‘extended’ sense. 
Return to our aforementioned scientist. His published reports on his tests are supposed 
to take into account all of the relevant experimental evidence at his disposal. But he 
need not—thank goodness!—memorise the results of each experiment he (or his 
automated system) conducted.  
 
Perhaps it is true that we are interested in what such a scientist is disposed to believe; 
in his dispositions to believe, as explained by Audi (1994). (Before I wrote this 
sentence, I had a disposition to believe that ‘145 multiplied by 0.9 is 130.5’ due to my 
understanding of elementary arithmetic. As I write this sentence, I occurrently believe 
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that ‘145 multiplied by 0.9 is 130.5’. And for quite a while after writing—until I 
forget—I will have the dispositional belief that ‘145 multiplied by 0.9 is 130.5’.7) But 
then, to reiterate, we are not merely interested in what he actually (occurrently or 
dispositionally) believes, at the point in time in question, when we calculate a 
confirmation value. We take the information in the notebook, which is not believed by 
anyone (unless we entertain the highly controversial notion of an ‘extended mind’), to 
be relevant to the state of science (as opposed to the scientist). In short, the notebook 
is like an external memory. The information in this external memory can be read by 
anyone with the right hardware and software (e.g. perceptual apparatus and language 
skills). 
 
There is one remaining worry. Didn’t I admit at the start of this section that 
sometimes, at least, we will be interested only in the beliefs of scientists? So might we 
not conclude that there are two kinds of confirmation: one objective, not concerning 
only beliefs, and one personal or interpersonal, which necessarily concerns beliefs?8 
We could. But I do not think we should. Rather, I think that we consider only beliefs, 
of necessity, when we are interested in determining a person’s or group’s 
confirmation estimate—or best confirmation estimate—for some theory. (The 
mathematical formulae used may stay the same. The interpretation of the values can 
differ.) But even if I am wrong, it does not follow that any personal or interpersonal 
sense of confirmation involves knowledge. As we will see, the relevant beliefs may be 
unjustified or false. 
 
3. ‘Background Knowledge’ without Justification 
 
Now let’s imagine that the argument made in the previous section fails (although I 
insist that it does not). Does it follow that b should be understood as ‘background 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 One could develop a similar account of dispositions to know, as opposed to dispositional knowledge. 
If one is disposed to form a true belief in a proposition in a reliable way, for instance, then one may 
have a disposition to know that proposition. Thus some might think I possessed a disposition to know 
that ‘145 multiplied by 0.9 is 130.5’ before writing this paper, and now possess dispositional 
knowledge of that proposition. 
8 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this interesting possibility. He/she agrees with me, 
however, that a personal or interpersonal sense of confirmation should not concern only true beliefs, 
and hence not only background knowledge. 
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knowledge’ rather than ‘background beliefs’ (or ‘background information that is 
believed’)? Not if b may include unjustified beliefs. 
 
The argument that it may is again based on possible applications of confirmation 
theory to actual situations. For in many actual situations, something is believed to be 
true without any justification in either an internal (i.e. personally accessible) or 
external sense.9 (And although we will not discuss this here, information that has 
never been the object of belief can be classified as true, e.g. in a computer file, by 
unreliable processes or for poor reasons.) 
 
Consider how often memories are appealed to in science and beyond, and how easily 
testimony based on memories may spread through a community. Now if we are to 
trust the findings of psychologists on how easily false memories may be created—see, 
for instance, Roediger and McDermott (1995)—then we must conclude that appeal to 
memory is unreliable in a significant class of circumstances (some of which will be 
relevant to memories invoked in scientific contexts). Hence it is not externally 
justified on a reliabilist account, in said class of circumstances, and it is difficult to 
see how it could be on any other externalist view of justification. 
 
Alternatively, consider the widespread belief in N-rays in early twentieth-century 
France. These were posited by a well-respected senior physicist, Blondlot, and over 
300 papers were written on the topic, by around 120 scientists, between 1903 and 
1906.10 But Blondlot was eventually discredited in an embarrassing fashion; for he 
claimed to be able to detect them even when an allegedly vital component of his 
apparatus—an aluminium prism—had been secretly removed by a visiting American 
physicist, Wood. Now the bulk of serious historical scholarship on this episode agrees 
that it is false, as Bird (2007, p. 67) has recently claimed, that ‘Blondlot believed in 
the existence of what he called N-rays for what it is clear were entirely spurious and 
irrational reasons.’11 (And even if Bird were right, then I could use this example, 
instead, in support of the view that beliefs unjustified in an internal sense can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In the words of Chisholm (1977, p. 17), on an internalist account: ‘we can know what it is, on any 
occasion, that constitutes our grounds, or reasons, or evidence for thinking that we know.’ 
10 The figures are reported by Lagemann (1977). 
11 Langmuir (1985) agrees with Bird’s sentiments. Price (1975) and Nye (1980) do not. 
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widespread in science.12) Rather, it seems that Blondlot and the other scientists 
concerned were relying on naked eye observations in a class of scenarios in which 
these are unreliable. Here’s what Bauer (2002) says about the episode: 
 
[P]resumably what was pathological here was a reliance on visual observation 
under conditions—a darkened room—where optical illusions readily occur. 
(One modern test for glaucoma is to note over what field of view one can 
detect flashes of light on a dark background. Anyone who has taken such a test 
knows that one ‘sees’ some number of flashes that are not actually there.) But 
Blondlot was a distinguished member of the French scientific establishment. 
He had been particularly praised for showing that X-rays moved at the speed 
of light which he had established by the same method of visual observation, in 
that case variations in the apparent intensity of electric sparks. Blondlot was 
therefore very unfortunate; but how can he be blamed for continuing to use a 
technique that had been so successful? “The curious error of N-rays is much 
more a sort of mass hallucination, proceeding from an entirely reasonable 
beginning” (Price 1975, p. 159). Moreover, the facts Blondlot reported were 
confirmed by a number of his fellow scientists, not only in his laboratory but 
also elsewhere in France; which gave Blondlot good reason to think his 
discovery a genuine one. 
 
Problems with memories, or even with simple observational beliefs, are also 
significant when we consider internal accounts of justification instead. For example, it 
is hard to see how the mere fact that I possess a memory that p makes me justified in 
believing that p when I am painfully aware of the ways in which my memory 
formation procedure may be flawed.13 Consider, in particular, the research in 
empirical psychology indicating that we often have false memories concerning the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The possibility of widespread unjustified beliefs in science is also defended in Rowbottom (2008b) 
and Rowbottom (2010), and appears to be accepted by Bird (2008) (in line with the quotation in the 
main text). 
13 As Steup (2006) notes, ‘Some internalists think that sensory experiences, in and by themselves, 
constitute evidence… Other internalists, however, think that S's sensory experiences constitute 
evidence only if S can coherently view them as a reliable guide to truth.’ The first route seems highly 
dubious, in so far as justificatory support, if it is to exist, only obtains between propositions or 
statements; and clearly we must not confuse the statements I believe to be true as a result of my 
experiences with the experiences themselves. (For more on this, see Popper’s discussion of what he 
calls ‘Fries’s trilemma’, which is better thought of as a dilemma-inducing dilemma, as shown by 
Bartley (1984, app. 3). For some interesting background on the trilemma, see Floridi (1996, pp. 112–
117).) 
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sources of—and sometimes, therefore, of the reasons for which we came to hold—our 
(true) beliefs.14 (And note that this research does not only concern odd scenarios. On 
the contrary, several are commonplace.) 
 
Besides, there are also actual situations in which theories, and predictions made by 
those theories, are uncritically maintained in the face of contradictory evidence. Think 
of poor Mpemba, the Tanzanian student who was ridiculed by his teacher and 
classmates for claiming that warm ice cream mix can freeze faster—or at the very 
least can start to freeze faster—than cold mix placed in the same freezer, and later 
claiming that the same was true of water. Mpemba certainly had the last laugh—see 
Mpemba and Osborne (1969), and Esposito et al. (2008)—although he was fortunate 
to encounter a physicist willing to take his claim seriously enough to test it (and 
displayed admirable courage in raising the question in public in spite of the aggressive 
dogmatism he had repeatedly been confronted with).15 In short, anything that 
(superficially) looked to challenge Newton’s law of cooling was typically dismissed 
by those better versed in physics than Mpemba. And the worry is that belief in said 
law, gained by testimony, was not sufficient to grant good reasons for believing that 
hot water would never start to freeze faster than cold, in the face of testimony to the 
contrary by someone who had done an appropriate experiment. 
 
A natural objection is that the source of the testimony—and in particular, the 
(perceived) expertise of the testifier—is relevant. Why take a school child seriously, 
in the face of the theory of a genius, and the might of the scientific establishment? My 
answer is twofold. First, the experiment is extremely easy to conduct; it was well 
within the abilities of Mpemba, as it is most teenagers. (Think of what justification 
there was, if any, for the teacher to fail to repeat it at least once. Failure to repeat, with 
ample opportunity to do so easily, plausibly removed any initial justification for 
believing Mpemba to be wrong.) Second, there are independent physical reasons not 
to be confident that Newton’s law of cooling is gospel. As Osborne puts it, recounting 
his initial reaction to Mpemba’s claim: ‘everyday events are seldom as simple as they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See, for example, Schacter et al. 1984, Jacoby et al. 1989, and Kelley and Lindsay 1993. 
15 The dogmatism was not confined to Mpemba’s school. Osborne writes: ‘At the University College in 
Dar es Salaam I asked a young technician to test the facts. The technician reported that the water that 
started hot did indeed freeze first and added in a moment of unscientific enthusiasm: “But we'll keep on 
repeating the experiment until we get the right result.”’ 
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seem and it is dangerous to pass a superficial judgment on what can and cannot be … 
it was possible that the rate of cooling might be affected by some factor I had not 
considered’ (Mpemba and Osborne 1969, 173–174).16 
 
Obviously I have not done full justice to the intricacies of accounts of justification in 
epistemology, or even come close, in the above. But the claim that unjustified beliefs 
are sometimes present in science and more particularly the background assumptions 
employed by scientists, is hardly objectionable. This is all I require in order for my 
overarching argument to go through. 
 
I should add that even justified true beliefs are not normally taken to constitute 
knowledge, due to the Gettier (1963) problem. This is yet another reason to insist that 
b should not be understood as ‘background knowledge’, when we consider actual 
cases. (See also the thought experiments, and more detailed discussion of different 
construals of knowledge and justification, in Rowbottom (2010).) In short, it suffices 
for justified true beliefs falling short of knowledge to sometimes be present. 
 
4. ‘Background Knowledge’ without Truth? 
 
Naturally, background assumptions used in actual science may also be false. 
Sometimes these assumptions may be rather simple, e.g. concern the number of 
planets in the solar system (in the case of the prediction of the paths of certain 
heavenly bodies). Other times they may be more complex, in so far as b may involve 
theories other than h; when the famous experiment in 1919 was conducted in order to 
examine whether light bends around the sun, for example, various theories other than 
general relativity were explicitly or implicitly taken for granted. The telescopes used 
were constructed on the basis of theories of optics. The results were taken to concern 
light, qua theoretical electromagnetic entity, in so far as Maxwell’s equations were 
not questioned. Telescopically observed deviations in the apparent position of stars 
were not attributed to atmospheric effects. And this was ultimately due to theoretical 
notions such as index of refraction. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Keep Duhem’s thesis in mind. The law of cooling does not, taken alone, issue in any predictions. 
Hence one simple explanation of the Mpemba effect, for example, might have been evaporation.	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However, one might argue that the real confirmation values are determined by the 
subset of scientific statements classified as true, at some time t, which are true. And 
once we have made confirmation an objective matter to the extent that it need not 
concern (individual or group) mental states at a particular time, as suggested above, 
this move appears far less unreasonable than it otherwise might. If one follows Floridi 
(2004, 2005) in thinking that all information is true, one might also maintain the view 
that ‘background information’ is an appropriate replacement for ‘background 
knowledge’. 
 
So should we hold that all information is true? I will not go into this issue in any 
serious depth here, for fear of straying too far from the central topic of this paper. 
Instead, suffice it to say that I am in two minds about whether a more lax notion of 
information would be appropriate. At first blush, “Darrell Rowbottom is six foot two 
inches tall” contains information about me despite its falsity (strictly speaking). But I 
suppose one might insist that this is an elliptical way of expressing “Darrell 
Rowbottom is approximately six foot two”, in everyday discourse. So far so good, but 
matters become more complex and troublesome when we consider scientific models. 
Everyone now agrees that Rutherford’s planetary model of the atom is false. Yet it 
may nevertheless hold valuable information about the atom that is not exhausted by 
the true observational consequences that can be derived from it (in combination with 
appropriate auxiliary hypotheses). In particular, some of the structure of the solar 
system may be present in the atom—the relation between the planets and the Sun may 
mirror that between the electrons and the nucleus in some respects, e.g. with respect 
to relative sizes, for instance—and thus we may think that we are informed about the 
atom to some extent in virtue of possessing such a model. It is also natural to think 
that science can progress through the development of models that bear better 
structural resemblances to their targets than their predecessors.17  
 
Champions of the view that all information is true may respond by arguing that a 
number of true analogical statements can be derived from such models, e.g. ‘Nuclei 
are bigger than electrons’, and that this is the sense in which they are informative (and 
can be more or less so). Indeed, I discuss such analogical statements in Rowbottom 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 One also makes progress in understanding science by changing the models in terms of which one 
thinks. See, for example, Collins and Gentner (1987). 
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(2011). However, it remains to be seen whether such a strategy will ultimately do the 
trick because it is unclear that all the information present in a model should be 
thought of as propositional.18 
 
For present purposes, then, let me just say that even if one insists all information is 
true, it does not follow that b should be understood as background knowledge rather 
than background information. The result, rather, is that one route to arguing that b 
should not be understood as background knowledge—that often we are interested in 
how confirmed a theory is relative to propositions which are classified as true but are 
actually false19—is precluded.  For the record, I should add that I currently prefer the 
view that information may be false, and that b should be allowed to include false 
statements.20 
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